Paths come from the repository package-file index for the observed builds. They describe archive/package associations, not every file that will exist on a running system after maintainer scripts, alternatives, generated state, diversions, or installation choices.
Jede Zeile ist Paketindex-Metadaten für eine Version, Architektur, Suite und ein Repository. Namen, URLs und Größen stammen aus der Quelle; ein Link ist ein veränderbarer Abrufort, kein Weitergabanspruch von OpenFactory.
An issue in the ConfirmNameConstraints() function (wolfcrypt/src/asn.c) of wolfSSL v5.9.1 and v5.9.2 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via providing crafted Certificate Authority cer
When an application enables both OCSP and CRL revocation checking on one WOLFSSL_CTX or certificate manager, wolfSSL skips the CRL check for any peer certificate that carries no Authority Information
A (D)TLS 1.2 client can accept a ChangeCipherSpec message before it has sent its ClientKeyExchange. No master secret has been derived at that point, so the client installs read keys derived from a kno
MatchTrustedPeer ignores the public key used, leading to forged CA clones passing verification. Affected builds are any that enable the macro WOLFSSL_TRUST_PEER_CERT and load CA certificates with wolf
A failed X509_verify_cert call permanently plants an unverified attacker CA in the shared CertManager, bypassing certificate validation in every type-blind sibling consumer (native TLS, OCSP, CRL, dir
A certificate with no dNSName SAN but another SAN type present (e.g. registeredID or iPAddress) bypassed the Subject CN dNSName name-constraint check. The CN-as-DNS fallback was gated on cert->subject
wolfSSL versions 5.9.2 and earlier contain a flaw in the X.509 certificate validation logic where it fails to properly enforce NameConstraints extensions when there is an unconstrained CA tier between
In all builds that make use of (D)TLS, including default builds, there is a series of conditional states during the TLS shutdown which could lead to a heap-use-after free. If an application ended up g
Without NO_SESSION_CACHE_REF, wolfSSL_get_session() does not return a session object but a ClientSession reference of the form {row, index, hash(sessionID)} into the process-global SessionCache, and C
Under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, ProcessPeerCertParse() runs the certificate signature check separately from the parse to keep peak memory down, then merges the two results, but it merged the signatur
wc_Blake2bHmacFinal and wc_Blake2sHmacFinal discard the message when the key length exceeds the block size, producing a MAC that is independent of the input. When the supplied key is longer than the B
iPAddress name constraints bypass when WOLFSSL_IP_ALT_NAME is not defined. IP address name constraints are not enforced in that configuration, allowing a certificate to bypass an issuing CA's IP addre
The ML-KEM ARM64 NEON ciphertext comparison only compares half of the input, breaking the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform's implicit rejection and weakening IND-CCA2 security on that code path. The constan
Missing SNI/ALPN binding on stateful (session-ID) resumption, which previously skipped the binding check performed for ticket-based resumption. A cached session could be resumed under a different SNI/
OCSP CertID serial-number length-confusion in wolfSSL_OCSP_resp_find_status allows a same-issuer SingleResponse whose serial is a prefix of the target serial to be reported as the revocation status of
A heap buffer overflow could occur in the DTLS 1.3 ACK serialization path before the connecting peer is authenticated. The buffer overflow was due to an integer truncation when computing the length of
Use-after-free in PQC hybrid key-share handling. This is an incomplete-fix follow-up to CVE-2026-5460 (released in 5.9.1): a malicious TLS 1.3 server sending a truncated PQC hybrid KeyShare can still
Chain intermediate CA:TRUE without keyCertSign accepted as a signing CA. Intermediate CA certificates are required to have the keyCertSign key usage when a Key Usage extension is present, but chain-su
Un-negotiated Raw Public Key (RFC 7250) accepted in place of an X.509 certificate, bypassing chain validation. A raw public key has no chain, so ParseCertRelative() accepts it without performing any t
