This package provides an LDAP back-end plug-in for BIND. It features
support for dynamic updates and internal caching, to lift the load
off of your LDAP server.
Each row is recorded package-index metadata for one version, architecture, suite, and repository. Names, URLs, and sizes are source-reported; a link is a potentially mutable retrieval location, not an OpenFactory redistribution claim or proof that OpenFactory retained the artifact bytes.
Dependencies and recommendations for bind-dyndb-ldap
Software version of a PKCS#11 Hardware Security Module
dep: libc.so.6(GLIBC_2.38)(64bit)
Package not available
Package file paths (17)
Paths come from the repository package-file index for the observed builds. They describe archive/package associations, not every file that will exist on a running system after maintainer scripts, alternatives, generated state, diversions, or installation choices.
If BIND encounters a particular invalid data structure in a DNS record, it will accept the invalid data, and may subsequently abort and exit.
BIND will first need to store a DNS record for a key (KEY
An attacker who knows (or guesses) that a resolver uses RPZ with wildcard CNAME policies can craft query names long enough to trigger a NAMETOOLONG error condition during RPZ processing. This is not h
The BIND resolver accepts validly-signed NSEC records where the "Next Domain Name" field points outside the signer's zone.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.2
For a secondary zone with transfers restricted by TSIG, `named` may start to serve the data provided in a zone transfer before the final message with the TSIG signature arrives. This could allow an at
An attacker may be able to cause a `named` resolver to abort. The attack requires inducing the victim resolver to send multiple queries for a DNSSEC-signed zone hosted by an authoritative server under
On a resolver configured to use ``dns64``, if an applicable answer from the authoritative server is malformed in a specific way, the resolver `named` process will exit unexpectedly.
This issue affects
If an attacker-controlled authoritative server can produce a negative answer that is exactly 65536 bytes, then a flaw in `named` results in a negative cache entry of 0 bytes. When this entry is subseq
A BIND recursive resolver may experience excessive resource consumption if it encounters large numbers of a particular kind of invalid DNSSEC record. Default limits on "max-records-per-type" and "max
An inapplicable NSEC record may be accepted by a `named` resolver as proof that no wildcard exists, which could allow an attacker at the same or an upstream level of the zone name to mask the existenc
In a query response, an attacker may send `named` multiple copies of a record that should only exist once (such as an SOA record). If the RDATA is the same on all the copies, the record is appended to
A validly signed NSEC3 from an unrelated sibling zone may be accepted as an insecurity proof, downgrading a secure delegation and letting a forged unsigned answer through.
This issue affects BIND 9 ve
A malformed zone may contain an NS or DNAME node above its origin, which `named` treats as a zone cut. If an attacker inserts a malformed zone into a BIND authoritative server (e.g., via zone transfer
If a BIND resolver sends a query for a DNSSEC-signed authoritative zone, and the authoritative server replies with a valid wildcard answer and signed NSEC3 proof, followed by an unsigned NSEC at the s
A BIND resolver encountering an SVCB/HTTPS AliasMode record referencing 14 or more SVCB/HTTPS ServiceMode records may fail to properly deallocate internal resources. If this happens repeatedly, resour
If a BIND resolver has cached a tree of SVCB/HTTPS AliasMode records, and is then queried for the root of that tree, the resolver will spend disproportionate CPU time constructing the response.
This i