Packages / openSUSE Tumbleweed / Unspecified / system-user-coco_as

[Source: trustee]

Package: system-user-coco_as (0.20.0~git60.435ed3c-1.3)

System user coco_as

System user coco_as for Confidential Containers Attestation Service

Other Packages Related to system-user-coco_as:

  • dep: /bin/sh

    Package not available

  • dep: [sysuser-shadow] (>= 3.2)

    Tool to execute sysusers.d with shadow utilities

  • dep: [trustee] (= 0.20.0~git60.435ed3c-1.3)

    Attestation and Secret Delivery Components

Download system-user-coco_as

ArchitecturePackage sizeInstalled sizeFilesPackage
x86_647.5 KiB137 Blist of filesDownload

Package file paths (2)

Paths come from the repository package-file index for the observed builds. They describe archive/package associations, not every file that will exist on a running system after maintainer scripts, alternatives, generated state, diversions, or installation choices.

  • /usr/lib/sysusers.d/system-user-coco_as.conf
  • /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/system-user-coco_as.conf

Field source: openSUSE Tumbleweed OSS

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Versions, suites, and repositories

Each row is recorded package-index metadata for one version, architecture, suite, and repository. Names, URLs, and sizes are source-reported; a link is a potentially mutable retrieval location, not an OpenFactory redistribution claim or proof that OpenFactory retained the artifact bytes.

VersionReleaseArchitectureRepositoryPackage sizeInstalled sizePublisher repository artifact
0.20.0~git60.435ed3c-1.3tumbleweed / ossx86_64openSUSE Tumbleweed · OSS · multi-architecture7.5 KiB137 Bx86_64/system-user-coco_as-0.20.0~git60.435ed3c-1.3.x86_64.rpm

Field source: openSUSE Tumbleweed OSS

Known vulnerabilities

No matching advisories in the tracked sources.

Last synced:

[CVE catalog]

Checksums

Repository signatures authenticate metadata. Artifact hashing is recorded separately. Neither establishes package safety.

0.20.0~git60.435ed3c-1.3 / x86_64Observed Sep 1, 2026sha512 644e44d5206f…e5207f2cSource-reported digest

Metadata observed; artifact bytes were not independently fetched or hashed by this catalog import. The digest below is source-reported.

Source-reported digest (sha512): 644e44d5206f73805e57ca41329a2cd728558fb638bd196ca2fa343b4ee427b63914226ae835ff56f4d92192ae62429827782e411c2b24e0feae7447e5207f2c

Field source: openSUSE Tumbleweed OSS

Sources

  • openSUSE Tumbleweed OSSSep 1, 2026

    Authoritative source; repository metadata signature verified

    Signature evidence

    tumbleweed-oss-multiarch:4db10cdde3ad82c7e22be35753c9e164b4bdd30f92db4aee17a0d4c94c5f902f

    Repository-signature verification record
    Signed-object SHA-256
    4db10cdde3ad82c7e22be35753c9e164b4bdd30f92db4aee17a0d4c94c5f902f
    Signer fingerprint
    AD485664E901B867051AB15F35A2F86E29B700A4
    Keyring revision
    opensuse-project-signing-key.asc
    SHA-256 b5745739ebfb95b25b8e810f9bcb847fe750ccda598bd85f02f0e974599a6d7e
    Tool and policy
    gpgv (GnuPG) 2.4.9
    openfactory-software-catalog-signature-v1
    Verification time
    Sep 1, 2026
    Repository metadata hash linkage
    Result
    Recorded as verified; digest details unavailable