podmansh provides a confined login and user shell with access to volumes and
capabilities specified in user quadlets.
It is a symlink to /usr/bin/podman and execs into the `podmansh` container
when `/usr/bin/podmansh` is set as a login shell or set as os.Args[0].
Paths come from the repository package-file index for the observed builds. They describe archive/package associations, not every file that will exist on a running system after maintainer scripts, alternatives, generated state, diversions, or installation choices.
Each row is recorded package-index metadata for one version, architecture, suite, and repository. Names, URLs, and sizes are source-reported; a link is a potentially mutable retrieval location, not an OpenFactory redistribution claim or proof that OpenFactory retained the artifact bytes.
The tar extraction routines in moby/go-archive (Unpack, UnpackLayer, Untar/UntarUncompressed, and the ApplyLayer helpers) do not confine filesystem operations to the destination directory. The extract
Podman is a tool for managing OCI containers and pods. From 1.8.1 until 5.8.4, a container image that contains a environment variable with just a key and no value can trick podman into passing that va
Podman is a tool for managing OCI containers and pods. Versions 4.8.0 through 5.8.1 contain a command injection vulnerability in the HyperV machine backend in pkg/machine/hyperv/stubber.go, where the
A flaw was found in Podman. The podman machine init command fails to verify the TLS certificate when downloading the VM images from an OCI registry. This issue results in a Man In The Middle attack.
